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Introduction
Existing federations typically entail a common personal tax base, a social security system, a common unemployment insurance, and, in some cases, a system of federal fiscal transfers across regions. Such a fiscal scheme may act as an automatic insurance against asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in a currency union. Thus, regions that fall behind pay less federal taxes and may receive more benefits, although the effective magnitude of the stabilization may be debateable (Feld and Osterloh, 2013) . In contrast, the euro area has no explicit mechanism for absorbing asymmetric shocks. This issue was heavily discussed when the Maastricht Treaty was drafted and the debate has been revived by the European debt crisis.
Increasingly, there are calls for such a transfer system in the Eurozone as a built-in insurance mechanism against asymmetric business cycle shocks. The past-president of the European Council, Van Rompuy, considers "an integrated budgetary framework"that includes a "fiscal capacity"for absorbing asymmetric shocks to be an essential building block for a "stable and prosperous EMU" (Van Rompuy, 2012) . The idea is to provide temporary relief for members hit by a negative shock by conditioning the received transfers on the change in a performance measure relative to the rest of the union. A performance measure can be the unemployment rate or GDP per capita. Conditioning on the change in the performance measure instead of the level aims to avoid a continuous redistribution from rich to poor regions and the political resistance that would come with this. While the call for a stabilization mechanism has been recently repeated in Juncker (2015) , many questions still arise. 1 This note adds to this discussion by considering the design of an insurance mechanism and computing the amount of transfers that would have taken place in the Eurozone in the last decade. In particular, we highlight a trade-off in designing any system of fiscal transfers in a federation consisting of members of different sizes. There exists no transfer system that can satisfy two conditions simultaneously: 1) A balanced budget of the transfer scheme, and 2) an equal treatment among member countries, where equal treatment is defined as identical transfers per capita triggered by an identical shock. The intuition is that in case of an asymmetric shock, a large region requires a higher amount of transfers than a small region implying higher payments per capita from inhabitants in the smaller regions.
How large is this trade-off in the Eurozone and what would be the amounts of these transfers in practice? To address these questions, we update the simple transfer system originally proposed by Italianer and Vanheukelen (1992) that defines transfers -recipients and payers -based on the deviation of the change in unemployment rate of a member country from the average of that of the rest of the union and caps transfers received at 2 percent of a member' GDP. In this system, the sum of transfers to below-average countries may not match "surpluses" generated in the above-average countries. Interestingly, according to our simulation, a symmetric system that treats shocks in small and large countries symmetrically would have produced a large budgetary surplus of 0.65 percent of Eurogroup GDP in 2009, the worst year of the financial crisis. In a further simulation, we modify the system to ensure a balanced budget and compute the net-contributions for all countries.
The Transfer Dilemma in a Federation: A Simple Proof
Assume there are n regions in a federation (a monetary union). The fraction of total population living in region i is x i , i = 1, .., n. Regions are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to income, i , affecting per capita performance measured for instance by the unemployment rate or per capita income. Let y i denote a performance measure andȳ i the trend (or average) of the federation. A shock can be measured as the deviation between the actual realized value and this trend value: i = y i −ȳ i , where i > 0 is a positive income or employment shock.
Definition 1 A balanced transfer system is a set of differentiable transfer functions that relates the transfer made (or received) by region i to the per capita size of the shock and satisfies the budget constraint:
As a convention, we define T i > 0 as a net receipt of region i. We can distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 Symmetric Regions:
3 Let be the average shock among all regions. Then, a linear system of transfers is defined as:
Case 2 Asymmetric Regions:
Let regions be of different sizes. Without loss of generality, consider two identical shocks to the per capita performance variable y i . An equivalent treatment is a situation in which an inhabitant in the large region receives (pays) the same amount as an inhabitant in the small region. Explicitly,
Axiom 2 For any arbitraryˆ ,
Given two shocks with an identical size, Axiom 1 asserts that transfers per capita should be equal in both regions. Axiom 1 and the assumption about differentiability imply Axiom 2.
Starting form an arbitrary level of shock, a small identical innovation in the shock in any two or more regions should trigger the same change in transfers per capita in these regions.
Proposition 1
Given arbitrary shock structures and asymmetrically sized regions, there exists no transfer system that complies with Definition 1, Axiom 1, and Axiom 2.
Proof. Consider two regions i and j. Assume that there exists a transfer system that respects the budget constraint and Axiom 1. Starting from the same initial conditionˆ , suppose that
Totally differentiating the budget constraint
This simple proof by contradiction reveals that in general it is not possible to design a transfer system that satisfies the budget constraint and implies equal per capita transfers.
Stabilisation Mechanism in the Eurozone: An Illustration
Intuitively, one can illustrate the trade-off by considering a polar case of a currency union between, e.g., Germany and Luxembourg. The insurance of one percent of German GDP would cost Luxembourg 63 percent of its GDP, whereas Germany can compensate one percent of Luxembourg GDP by paying only 0.016 percent of its GDP. 2 The important question is:
how would transfers and the trade-off in the euro area look like in practice? We provide answers by simulating a built-in stabilisation scheme (IV) originally proposed by Italianer and Vanheukelen (1992) . Let transfers received be denoted by R i and contributions by C i .
A member country i receives transfers R it in year t if the percentage point change ("shock") in its unemployment rate ∆u it is positive and larger than the area average ∆u EU t , which is calculated excluding country i. Similarly to a suggestion in Van Rompoy (2012), IV is designed in terms of the changes and not the levels of the performance variable. The amount of transfers received is given by α[∆u it − ∆u EU t ]y i , where y i denotes GDP. The parameter α is set by IV to 0.01. In addition, the system imposes a limit on the received transfers of 2 percent of GDP. 3 Note that since IV computes the average ∆u EU t excluding the own country i, it complies with Axiom 1: 4
As we know from Proposition 1, a symmetric system cannot be balanced if countries are asymmetric. This leads to the natural question of how large the implied surpluses and deficits 2 For a similar observation, see von Hagen and Hammond (1998, p. 335) . 3 Italianer and Vanheukelen (1992) discuss the benefits of using unemployment as the reference performance. For our purposes, considering GDP growth instead of unemployment growth would not matter. As clarified by our proof, the trade-off is present independent of the choice of the per capita performance variable.
4 Note that if averages are computed including the own country then the term ∂∆u EU ∂∆uit is not zero. In this case, by definition, the sum of transfers received equals the sum of surpluses of above-average members. However, this means a country's own performance affects the reference measure. For a discussion of such effects within the German federal system see Konrad and Seitz (2003) . of the IV system would be when implemented in reality. For this purpose we use yearly data on past unemployment and GDP for 17 Eurozone member countries. A simplifying assumption is that transfers do not influence GDP. Obviously, there are a number of ways to define the contributions of above average performing countries. An intuitive suggestion is to relate the payments of each contributor to its above-average performance analogously to recipients; i.e., every above-average country denoted by j pays based on α[∆u EU t − ∆u jt ]y j . The figures for net-contributers in Table ( 1) are calculated on the basis of a balanced scheme. 5 To reach a balanced budget we take the total amount of money received (R t = i R ti ) as implied by IV, and complete the transfer scheme as follows:
• Step 1: Analogously to the equation determining transfers received, the amount of money that has to contributed by country j is given by:
Unlike in the unbalanced system, we cannot impose α = β, but β is determined en-5 For net-receivers, the figures are independent of whether the scheme is balanced or not.
6 dogenously by the system and α = β reflects asymmetric treatment of shocks.
•
Step 2: We impose the zero-sum transfers' constraint:
C jt . This constraint and equation (6) together give a unique value of β:
The result of this step may yield C tj ≤ 2 percent of GDP ∀ j. In this case, the algorithm ends here and the system is balanced without violating the thresholds. That would have been the case in most years. For example, in 2012, the highest contribution was by Finland with 1.8% of GDP. The second possibility gives C lt > 2 percent of GDP for at least one country l. In this case, the upper cap is violated and the system would be imbalanced. That was the case in 2005 for Estonia, Slovakia and Spain and in 2003 for
Slovakia. In such a case, we have to proceed with the algorithm in order to respect the upper cap and the balanced budget constraint.
Step 3: If C lt > 0.02y lt for some donors l = 1 . . . L, then let C lt = 2 percent of GDP;
i.e, make the 2 percent of GDP binding. This leaves R t,rest = R t − L l=1 C lt for the other donor countries. Accordingly, the value of β for the remaining countries derives as
Step 4: For sake of completeness, in the special case that all donor countries are hitting the cap of 2 percent of GDP, α for the receiving countries has to be reduced to secure a balanced budget. According to our simulations this would not have occurred during
2001-2012.
In 2005, contributions by Estonia, Slovakia, and Spain were capped at 2 percent of GDP and the contributions of other members, e.g., Finland, Greece, and Luxembourg, were increased such that the system is balanced without violating the caps. Additionally, Table (1) indicates heterogeneous country experiences. For instance, in the case of France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, we notice that the width of fluctuations in transfers over the years is relatively narrow compared to smaller members such as Estonia, Slovakia, and Spain, which confirms previous results by von Hagen and Hammond (1998) .
Summary
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Note: R denotes received transfers according to system IV. C denotes implied contributions by the algorithm described in the text. All figures are expressed as ratios to GDP. β is computed as described in the text, and it measures a country's contribution, as a fraction of GDP, for each percentage point the unemployment rate is lower than the rest of the area average. In 2005, the value of β corresponds to contributors for which the cap of 2 percent of GDP is not binding.
